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Abstract 
This is a broad-ranging discussion of the role of economics and economists in the 
formation of government policies. The focus is on helping economists who wish to 
be influential in the policy process. The paper covers rationales for and against 
economist involvement in the policy process (market failure, government failure, 
economist failure), a range of theories that attempt to explain aspects of the policy 
process, and practical advice and insights based on the experiences of policy 
economists. Many challenges are highlighted, but some clear opportunities are 
apparent, particularly through explicit advocacy for the public interest.  
Introduction 
In this paper I address the challenges and opportunities facing economists who wish 
to be influential in the formation of policy? There are plenty of both. While members 
of other disciplines tend to view economics as being far too influential on 
government policy, economists are often frustrated at the blatant and pervasive 
policy inefficiencies that persist despite their best efforts. My aim is to help 
economists consider their role in the policy process, in terms of its appropriateness 
and effectiveness. The approach is to bring together a range of theory, empirical 
research and practical experience to provide practical insights and advice.  
The next section outlines the scope of politics as considered here, and describes the 
key groups of political players. Then I examine a range of rationales for or against 
economist involvement in the policy process, including arguments around market 
failure, government failure and economist failure. There follows a brief overview of 
a range of very different theories about how policy is developed and influenced, with 
most attention paid to the favourite of economists: public choice theory. This flows 
into discussions of the specific challenges and opportunities facing policy-relevant 
economists, including lessons that have been learnt by economists from practical 
experience in the policy process. Most of the material is relevant to economists 
working in any problem area, but examples are drawn mainly from the areas of 
agriculture and natural resource management.  
Politics 
I will take politics to be the full range of social forces influencing government 
policy. Policy means the government‟s laws, regulations, financial programs and 
their interpretation, administration and supporting structures.    3 
The players in politics may be categorised into at least five groups: the voting public, 
politicians and their parties, bureaucracies, interest groups and the media (Table 1). 
Ingredients of politics in a democracy include the values and attitudes of the voting 
community, the quest for power and survival by politicians and their parties, the 
ideologies and values of those political parties, the media as communicator and 
watchdog, the pursuit of resources, influence and effectiveness by the public service, 
and the attempts of interest groups to have their interests met. Among the players 
there is a mixture of people seeking advantage for themselves or some group, and 
people seeking to do “the right thing” for the whole community. The outcome and 
the instrument of politics is government policy. 
Ministers play a special role in the policy process. They have more individual power 
than any other player, although even for them, the power to make major changes to 
program design comes along only occasionally, and is constrained by political and 
budgetary considerations. A reality of politics is that most ministers are highly 
concerned about maintaining a positive public profile for themselves in the media 
and amongst the community. There are exceptions, but most ministers have only a 
superficial knowledge of the many issues about which they have to make decisions. 
Most rely heavily on their advisors for background, advice and speech preparation.  
 
Table 1. The players in politics 
Broad category of players  Elements of the category 
The voting public  Divisions with identifiably different views on issues include: 
  Urban versus rural  
  Young versus old 
  Green versus brown 
Political parties  Party politics 
National versus state governments 
Backbenchers  
Ministers  
Bureaucracies   National government agencies 
State government agencies  
Local government  
Commissions and Authorities 
Research funding organisations 
Interest and advocacy groups  Local farmer groups  
Environmental advocacy organisations 
Agricultural advocacy organisations  
Agribusiness and other commercial interests 
Think tanks/institutes 
Researchers 





Bureaucracies vary widely in their powers, their regional scopes and their characters. 
Amongst government agencies, a core concern is keeping their ministers happy. This   4 
includes keeping the agency out of trouble in the media, delivering successfully on 
any pet projects of the minister or of the ruling party, and responding rapidly to any 
ad hoc requests. Beyond this, agencies are variously concerned with implementing 
policies, programs and legislation, pursuing the best interests of the public, and 
capturing resources, powers and responsibilities. Sometimes inter-agency rivalry is 
an influence on agency behavior. For example, such rivalries sometimes arise 
between agencies with a focus on agriculture and agencies with a focus on the 
environment. 
Godden (1997) described the interaction of these players in what he calls “political 
markets” where the currency is not dollars, but deals, votes and political advantage, 
or, to use Becker‟s (1983) term, political favours. The players may have widely 
differing perspectives and be in pursuit of widely differing policy outcomes. As 
outlined later, there is no single dominant theory of how the players interact in 
political markets to produce policies (Sabatier, 1999; Birkland, 2001). 
Rationales for or against economist intervention 
The literature provides several arguments for or against economist intervention to 
attempt to influence governments, most prominently the ideas of market failure and 
government failure. I will also broach the possibility of economist failure.  
Market failure 
If markets fail, in the sense that they fall short of the performance of perfect markets, 
government intervention in the markets may potentially improve their efficiency. 
Commonly recognised causes of market failure include externalities, non-rival 
goods, non-price-excludable goods, monopoly, and information failures. Micro-
economists routinely invoke the concept of market failure and attempt to use it to 
influence government action so that it focuses on cases where it will more likely 
contribute to increased aggregate social welfare.  
Many of us take the concept of market failure for granted, but it is worth noting that 
it is, in fact, rather problematic. The problems include the following. 
There has been criticism of the very concept of market failure on the basis that real 
markets always fail to measure up to the idealised markets of perfect competition 
(Pasour, 1993). This means that “market failure” alone provides us with no useful 
criterion for assessing options for government intervention.  
Furthermore, the standard concept of market failure takes no account of the 
transaction costs that would be borne in any attempted intervention. Transaction 
costs of government involvement are often large. For example, the transaction costs 
of obtaining a dollar through the Australian taxation system for expenditure in 
government programs has been estimated to be around $0.40 (Findlay and Jones 
1982). If transaction costs are recognised, it cannot be proven that government action 
is warranted simply because a traditional cause of market failure exists (Dahlman 
1979). “When transaction costs are taken into account, economic analysis has yet to 
develop a reliable system for identifying … examples of market failure that have 
relevance for public policy” (Pasour, 1993, p.2).   5 
Perhaps we need to identify market failures that are sufficiently severe to outweigh 
transaction costs of trying to overcome them. Some applied economists in policy 
agencies have an awareness of this problem, and adjust their evaluation criteria 
subjectively by requiring interventions to generate larger net benefits in order that 
they might outweigh transaction costs. This requires us to go beyond theoretical 
justifications and into the realm of quantitative estimation of benefits and costs.  
I suggest that the overall implication for economists is to exercise caution in their 
use of the market failure concept to justify government intervention. It is, at best, the 
first in a series of steps needed to determine whether government intervention can be 
expected to enhance social welfare.  
Government failure 
The theory of market failure is primarily normative; it attempts to identify situations 
where governments should behave in certain ways. The concept of government 
failure, on the other hand, is mainly positive; it reflects limitations in how 
governments do actually behave. There is plenty of evidence that, even with the best 
of intentions, governments can make things worse rather than better.  
Public choice theory (Mueller 1997, 2003) has highlighted the inevitability of 
government failure (as well as that the people involved do not necessarily have the 
best of intentions). It has elucidated problems arising from the incentives that 
political players face, from information failures of various types, and from 
opportunities for rent seeking.  
The implication from this insight for economists interested in influencing policy 
development is rather different to that from market failure: “Economics can play an 
important role in disabusing policy makers of the idea that there is a feasible 
substitute for decentralised market prices as a means of discovering, coordinating 
and communicating information throughout the economic system” (Pasour, 1993, 
p.7). I don‟t believe it implies that government intervention is never warranted, but 
that advocates for intervention need to be conscious of what can go wrong.  
Hogwood and Peters (1985) provide an exhaustive catalogue of the many and varied 
ways in which governments may fail. Using the medical metaphor of „pathologies‟, 
they group a vast variety of problems in design and administration of public policies 
into seven broad categories (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Pathologies of public policy (source: based on Hogwood and Peters 1985) 
Pathology  Example 
Congenital diseases  Conflicting objectives; vague objectives; impossible objectives; 
inherited commitments 
Organisational pathologies  Organisations seek their own interest, pursuing power and 
resources; organisations attempt to minimise change; equate their 
own activities with the public interest; organisations conflict over 
goals; organisation captured by a group of stakeholders; 
procedures dominate; empire building   6 
Informational pathologies  Passive approach to information; failure to evaluate; failure to 
communicate information to decision makers inside the 
organisation; use of out of date information; poor targeting of 
benefits; learning disabilities; memory loss 
Delusions and other mental 
disorders 
Policy agoraphobia (fear of openness with the public); delusions 
of grandeur or importance; belief in silver bullets; belief in 
disciplinary superiority; belief in the sunk-cost fallacy 
Obesity  Excessive expenditure; expenditure on projects with negative Net 
Present Values; having more resources than can be spent well 
Pathology of budgeting  Earmarking (hypothecation) of funds; uncontrollable expenditure 
commitments; under-resourced programs; corruption 
Terminal conditions  Solution of the problem (but temporary persistence of the 
program); death by a thousand cuts; homicide 
 
It is a rather salutary list of problems which helps to reveal much about the nature of 
many government bureaucracies. Nevertheless, we should not conclude that there is 
no hope of influencing government programs for the better. For one thing, where 
current programs fall far short, relatively modest changes may generate substantial 
benefits to society, even if they do not take us close to an ideal policy.  For another, 
there are plenty of examples where economists have palpably made a positive 
difference in the past. On the other hand, we perhaps need to be aware of the risk 
that economists making a difference may not always be a good thing. 
Economist failure 
It is not difficult to identify weaknesses in economic theories or their specific 
applications (e.g. Fullbrook, 2004). Of course, economists are not the only discipline 
to, at times, make counterproductive charges into the policy realm, but I will keep 
my comments close to my disciplinary home. I will focus on a few points that relate 
directly to our role in influencing policy. 
A common criticism is that some economists tend to neglect other disciplines that 
would better inform their analyses and complement their perspectives. Nobel Prize 
winner Friedrich Hayek has made this point most forcefully: “While you may be a 
very useful member of society if you are a competent chemist or biologist, but know 
nothing else … if you know only economics and nothing else, you will be a bane to 
mankind, good, perhaps, for writing articles for other economists to read, but for 
nothing else.” (Hayek, 1991, p.42). 
Perhaps related to this is the criticism that the assumptions used in economic models 
are often unrealistic and simplistic. To some extent this reflects a strong tendency in 
academic economics to emphasise theoretical work ahead of empirical work, even 
where there is limited empirical underpinning for the theories. Mueller (1997) noted 
that almost all of the early classics in the public choice literature were theoretical 
contributions. Its leading lights mostly avoided testing their ideas in empirical 
research (e.g. Romer 1988). Although empirical work is increasingly evident, the 
subject is still dominated by the overly-theoretical approach common to much of 
academic economics. “Public choice scholars have sometimes been too quick to 
adopt simple (naïve) behavioural assumptions and too slow to abandon them when   7 
confronted with contradictory evidence, tendencies that carry over from economics” 
(Mueller 1997, p.15). 
I have observed that economists sometimes confuse themselves and others about 
policy-relevant aspects of economic theory. The earlier discussion of uncritical use 
of the concept of market failure is one example.  
Another example is that economists sometimes get confused about the relationship 
between externalities and market failure. Just because externalities exist, it does not 
necessarily follow that there is any scope for government intervention to increase 
welfare, even if there are no transaction costs from the intervention. “If with 
government intervention, the losses exceed the gains, the spillovers should remain” 
(Pasour, 1993, p.3). Thus a net-benefit test is a crucial part of assessing whether a 
potential market failure is an actual market failure; theory is not sufficient. My work 
on dryland salinity in Australia has highlighted cases where externalities are not 
associated with market failure (Pannell et al. 2001). 
A third example is the common failure to distinguish clearly between public goods 
and public benefits. The argument for providing some public goods is relatively 
clear in theory, although difficult in practice, as we have noted. In the case of public 
benefits, the argument one hears is that governments should focus on funding works 
that generate public benefits, not private benefits. Some people seem to think that 
this arises from the theory of public goods. In fact, it comes from the pragmatic 
observation that if the private benefits of a good are sufficiently positive, the good 
will be purchased without government funding, so public funding should be saved 
for other uses. 
These three examples point to the need for economists to get their story straight, 
rather than for them to stay out of the policy debate. However, there is a group of 
economists that does argue against economist input to the political process, on the 
grounds that the process is already efficient. The Chicago school of political 
economy, led by George Stigler (1988), argues in classic economist style that the 
policy programs that survive are better than the alternatives in having lower 
deadweight losses. They propose that policy choices already take account of 
whatever established knowledge that economists possess, with the implication that 
any further influence by economists can only make matters worse (Pasour, 1993).  
In some ways this idea encourages us to work on our humility, and to recognise that 
factors other than the economic efficiency of markets are at play. On the other hand, 
it has a sort of economic fundamentalist flavour that I find particularly unattractive. 
In my view, the reality is that competition cannot drive out inefficiencies in political 
markets because the markets are monopolistic, and information failures are rampant.  
Understanding politics and policy formation 
Effective engagement with the policy process requires some understanding of that 
process. Generally the available theories of policy formation provide relatively 
generic understanding at an aggregate level. This needs to be supplemented by more 
specific and detailed knowledge of the behaviour and perspectives of policy players, 
specific options for policy mechanisms, and of the historical context for specific 
policies. In this section I provide some brief description and commentary on the   8 
high-level theories. In a later section on “opportunities”, I present a selection of 
specific insights and advice from people involved in the policy process. 
As noted earlier, there are numerous theories offered to explain the pattern of 
formation of government policies. Table 3 presents a selection. In my view, each of 
these theories/approaches is insufficient in itself. The reality of policy formation is 
that it reflects all of these theories to some extent. Policy choices are, at times, 
influenced by: demographic changes (e.g. the aging population has influenced 
policies about retirement savings in Australia); previous policies (e.g. the Landcare 
policy in Australia, although now out of favour, can be seen to have influenced the 
shape of its successor, the Natural Heritage Trust); perceptions about the public 
interest (e.g. education and health policies); and the private interests of various 
policy players (e.g. benefits to specific interest groups). It is hard to imagine that a 
useful comprehensive model will ever be developed of such a messy, complex and 
heterogeneous system. I suggest that we should take none of the theories too 
seriously, but should attempt to learn from the key insights of each.  
 
Table 3. Selected theories and approaches for understanding politics and policy 
formation (source: based on Lane 1993) 
Theory/approach  Characteristics 
Demographic 
approach 
Hypothesis: Policy choices explained by influences from the environment. 
Approach based on regression against independent variables such as affluence, 
social structures, trade unions, and political parties.  
Problem: Lacks theoretical structure. Provides limited insight into future 
choices. 
Incrementalism   Hypothesis: Current policies explained as incremental changes from past 
policies. Previous decisions are crucial determinants of current policies.  
Problem: Cannot explain why policies change. Less relevant where decision 
processes and political structures are unstable over time. 
Rational decision 
making 
Hypothesis: Policies chosen to best achieve stated goals, based on perfect 
knowledge. 
Problem: Unrealistic. In reality there are numerous sources of uncertainty in 
cause and effect, and goals are ambiguous.  
“Garbage-can” 
model 
Hypothesis: Policy choice is irrational. Values being sought are ambiguous, 
cause and effect are uncertain, choices reflect political symbolism.  
Problem: Over-emphasises irrationality. No clear implications or predictions. 
Public choice 
theory 
Hypothesis: Agents involved in politics and policy formation act rationally in 
pursuit of their self interest. 




Hypothesis: No overarching hypothesis. Consists of presentation of specific 
insights and experiences from policy formation process 
Problem: Non-theoretical.  
   9 
Public choice theory is worthy of further comment here, as it is the approach most 
commonly used by economists. Its distinguishing characteristic is that it seeks to 
understand politics via application of the behavioural assumption that the individuals 
involved in all parts of the political system seek to advance their rational self 
interest.  
Clearly this is a considerable simplification. The observation that people vote in non-
compulsory elections shows that more than rational self interest is involved. (There 
is probably more chance of being killed in a traffic accident on the way to a polling 
booth than of one‟s vote being decisive in determining the result.) Nevertheless, the 
assumption has been found to be a fruitful basis for studying politics.  
Growing out of classic works, such as those by Arrow (1951), Downs (1957), 
Buchanan (1949), Buchanan and Tullock (1962), and Olson (1965) public choice 
theory has provided insight into a remarkable array of issues (Mueller 2003). For 
example, there are studies of the economic basis for collective choice, the distinction 
between efficiency and redistribution as roles for government, voting behaviour, the 
economics of clubs, the behaviours of two-party and multi-party systems, social 
welfare functions, national constitutions, and taxation.  
Much of public choice theory deals with questions that are not closely related to the 
main question addressed in this paper (how to be influential in the formation of 
policy). More relevant to our interests here are studies that address rent seeking, 
public bureaucracies, the size of government, interest groups, and the making of 
political deals. The key insights from public choice theory for an aspiring policy-
relevant economist probably include: 
  the insight that is built into the theory by assumption: that policy players are 
often self interested; 
  that different policy players have different objectives (because their interests 
are different), and are not necessarily pulling together towards the goal of 
advancing the public interest; 
  the need to be alert to wasteful transaction costs associated with rent seeking, 
and government processes generally; 
  that rational bureaucratic behaviour can promote inefficiency, excessive 
growth, capture by interest groups, weak accountability, and related problems 
that undermine effective government; and  
  that understanding the policy approach benefits from a multidisciplinary 
approach. 
Fundamentally, however, public choice theory is limited in its utility for our 
purposes because it overlooks, and perhaps actively discounts, one of the most 
powerful levers available to economists who wish to influence policy: the moral high 
ground. I will be arguing that economists can sometimes gain status and influence in 
the policy process by explicitly seeking to identify and advance the public interest.    10 
Challenges for economists 
There are numerous challenges for economists in the policy sphere. Politics is 
messy, complex, and often rather depressing for those who seek advancement of the 
public interest. “Most of the most important results of the early public choice 
literature conveyed a rather negative message about the potential of democracy and 
about its effects” (Mueller 1997, p. 7). Here I outline some of the more common 
challenges that one faces when attempting to influence the policy process to achieve 
efficient outcomes.  
There are often conflicts between short-term political objectives and long-term needs 
for efficient policies. “Good advice on economic policy is often about convincing 
others that short-term responses are inappropriate” (survey respondent Alistair 
Watson, quoted by Pannell 2004). 
As an outside expert, it can be difficult to establish credibility with policy makers, 
especially if you are not based in their local region. Feldman et al. (2001, p. 313) 
found that state-level “policy makers seek and prefer to use information obtained 
directly from trusted sources, preferably from sources with immediate knowledge of 
their state‟s circumstances, priorities and needs.” The tendency to rely on local, 
trusted information sources means that the selection of information to use in policy 
formation is partial and somewhat hit-and-miss. Indeed, the “experts” who are 
listened to may not contribute to a more efficient policy. They may not even be 
experts in the relevant issues: “Much of the problem with bad policy comes from 
smart, articulate people who are operating out of their skill zone” (survey respondent 
Gary Stoneham, quoted by Pannell 2004). 
Politicians like a crisis. It attracts the attention of the community, and offers 
opportunities for heroic and helpful deeds. The community also seems to like a 
crisis, and responds to catastrophic predictions (Lomborg 2001), including, recently, 
the Y2K bug and global climate change. There is a strong temptation for political 
advocates to exaggerate the severity of the problems they wish to have addressed, 
contributing misinformation to the policy decision process. This may prompt urgent 
and short-term responses, when the real need is for careful consideration and 
analysis before policy strategies are selected.  
There is often a mismatch between the complexity of policy problems and the 
simplicity of policy responses. For some problems, in my experience particularly 
environmental problems, there can be a great diversity of technical, economic and 
social issues that need to be understood, some of which are subtle, counter-intuitive 
and complex. This makes it difficult even to communicate succinctly to senior policy 
players who are not already well informed about the details of the problem. Policy 
proposals need to be simple and bland enough to achieve agreement, and this can 
tend to drive decision making to a lowest common denominator (Eckersley, 2003). 
Hamilton (2003) argues that “the political process … remains too immature to deal 
properly with detailed and reasoned analysis of issues” (p. 129). 
For some issues, an efficient policy would involve different policy mechanisms in 
different circumstances (e.g. Ridley and Pannell, 2005). However, the policy process 
prefers a simpler policy structure, preferably with a uniformly applied policy   11 
mechanism. In some cases this might be justified on the basis of lower transaction 
costs, but in others I suggest that it results in substantial opportunity costs to society.  
Complexity and diversity can mean that there is no consistent message going to 
policy makers. For example, few people are well informed about the full range of 
background information relevant to salinity in Australia (which include 
hydrogeology, economics, biology, engineering options, water resources, the context 
of commercial agriculture, social aspects, biodiversity, and politics), and many 
contributions to the public debate are narrowly conceived and poorly justified 
(Pannell 2005). Even among relatively well-informed commentators, the nature of 
the required policy response is disputed. For example, Beresford et al. (2001) 
characterise the problem as lack of sufficient public resources, whereas I judge that 
total funding is appropriate, but poorly allocated (Pannell 2001). Some expert 
commentators focus on the need for hydrological data for targeting investments, 
some on the development of new management options, some on the use of 
engineering options, some on the importance of communication and education. One 
has sympathy for policy makers trying to decide whom to believe. 
Politicians like everyone to feel that they are winners, or failing that, politicians like 
to closely control who are the winners and losers. This can result in a tendency for 
program funds to be shared widely among all members of the relevant section of the 
community, when an efficient approach would involve targeting of funds to priority 
cases. One hears the concept of „fairness‟ invoked in discussions about this. It 
appears that political fairness tends to focus on one dimension of fairness: the 
expectation of current beneficiaries. Whether it is fair to taxpayers to spend tax 
dollars in programs that will not be very effective in achieving their objectives is less 
often considered. 
The very existence of a system of funding creates considerable political pressure for 
its continuation. Understandably, those involved in spending the funds actively 
participate in the political process to endeavour to preserve the system. Even if new 
information about the policy issue indicates that a change is needed, it may be 
politically difficult to achieve. For example, the National Landcare Program in 
Australia created many new positions for Landcare facilitators. The facilitators were 
imbued with a particular philosophy of working with farmer groups to address 
environmental issues on farms. Over time, it has become clear that this approach and 
philosophy are less effective in preventing land degradation than was originally 
expected. Partly in response to this, the Program is undergoing change. However, 
changing the system is made difficult by the existence of many hundreds of 
facilitators who are philosophically connected to and financially dependent on the 
existing system, connected within bureaucratic and political networks, and able to 
mobilise the more committed farmers from their groups to fight in defence of the 
status quo. 
Opportunities for economists 
Notwithstanding the deep-seated problems with many public policies, and the 
challenges inherent in the policy process, I believe that economists can, at least 
sometimes, play a valuable role in improving policies. Of course, it is not easy. 
Merely publishing the results of economic research, no matter how important its 
findings are, will not be sufficient. Rather, success requires a major commitment to   12 
engage with the policy process, efforts to understand the process and the players in 
some detail, and attention to strategies for effective communication. It is necessary 
to become an active advocate for your position. 
The options for engagement for economists outside the public sector include:  
  through politicians and political parties (internally or externally) 
  through contributions to the public debate (e.g. economists with high media 
profiles include John Quiggin in Australia and Paul Krugman in the USA) 
  through bureaucracies (internally and externally) 
Government-employed economists have a narrower range of options, but might 
possibly have easier access to some important policy players.  
The main reason I have at least some degree of optimism is that, in my experience, 
the idea of the „public interest‟ does have a genuine currency in policy circles, and 
advocates for the public interest do have a legitimate and respected role in policy 
debates. The public interest can clearly be thwarted in a large variety of ways, but it 
cannot be made to seem irrelevant. Some people involved in the policy process 
unashamedly pursue sectoral interests, but others do attempt to pay attention to the 
public interest, and may cultivate input from those with relevant information about 
it. There are enough people involved who are genuinely sympathetic to the public 
interest for it to be relevant, and those who are not find it difficult to resist openly, 
although you can be sure that they do so behind the scenes. 
In 2002 I conducted a small survey of experienced policy players in Australia to gain 
insight into how economists can influence the policy process (Pannell 2004). The 
theoretical framework underlying my interpretation of the survey was based on 
Bayesian-style learning by individual policy makers and policy advisors, based on a 
similar model for adoption of innovations by land managers (Abadi Ghadim and 
Pannell 1999). It was recognised that policy players may have a variety of goals, 
rather than a single common goal, and that advice from economists can influence the 
policy process by reducing uncertainty about how best to achieve those goals. 
Respondents provided a wealth of practical advice and insights into the policy 
process, some of which is summarised here.  
  Understand the policy maker‟s perspective. What are their objectives and 
constraints (e.g. political, resource)? Assumed generic objectives, such as 
„pursuit of self interest‟, are not sufficient. What are their current perceptions 
of the issue? You will probably need to work on changing them 
incrementally, rather than expecting people to suddenly abandon their current 
perceptions. 
  Forget about trying to convert any adversary you have in the policy debate. 
The probably of success is too low to be worth the effort. 
  Address the case, not your opponent‟s motives. Independent observers of the 
debate want convincing about the substantive issues. 
  Give the advice in a problem-solving manner. Don‟t just point out current 
problems.   13 
  Get in early if possible. Once policy positions are established, they are more 
difficult to change (as in the Incrementalism theory, Table 3). 
  Be persistent and patient. Making major changes to policies is likely to take 
years or even decades. 
  Network and build support. Time-consuming efforts to communicate 
frequently and widely can help to build support for change among both 
policy makers, interest groups and interested members of the wider 
community. “Preaching to the converted, far from being a superfluous 
activity, is vital. Preachers do it every Sunday.” (Harries 2002). 
  Understand the policy process. There is often a mismatch between what 
information policy makers say they need and what researchers provide.  
  Develop a deep and broad knowledge of technical aspects of the issue. 
“Make sure that you know several times more about a topic than you can 
conceivably use or show. This is important, for one thing, because you will 
not know in advance what precisely you will have to use on any given 
occasion. Even more important, the fact that you have much in reserve 
(which will usually become evident through an accumulation of small 
touches) will give a resonance and authority to what you do use.” Harries 
(2002). This is a particularly important point, with strong implications for the 
way that economists approach their analysis and communication.  
  Be clear and brief. Avoid jargon and technical issues. 
  Quantify the impacts of options, rather than relying on abstract argument. 
Basic quantitative data or analytical results can be highly influential on 
policy makers, even without the analyst adopting an explicit policy position. 
  Also include qualitative information. Anecdotes or information about 
attitudes can reinforce quantitative information. 
  Relate your recommendation to Government‟s stated policy objectives. Try 
to identify hooks within the current policy from which you can argue that 
your proposed changes are consistent with the existing aims (Incrementalism 
again). 
  Pay attention to transaction costs. Proposals that are complex or expensive to 
implement will be resisted. 
 
Engaging with bureaucracies is one important channel of potential influence. 
Bureaucracies play a key role in the policy process, particularly in the detailed 
design and implementation of policy programs. Often, the devil is in the detail of 
policy design, over which bureaucracies sometimes have a high degree of control. 
The degree of influence that they do have depends on the issue, the interests of their 
minister, and their skill in influencing the policy process. Each bureaucracy has its 
own character, but some characteristics that I have observed in some specific 
bureaucracies are as follows:  
  a dislike of criticism. They may interpret it as a lack of understanding of the 
issues on the part of the critic. 
  a desire to be acknowledged for effort and perceived success. 
  a tendency to focus primarily on currently topical problems, and to neglect 
even serious issues surrounding programs that are not currently high on the 
political agenda, or that are not at a stage in the policy cycle where they need 
attention.   14 
  a preference for advice that is very brief and highly integrated. 
  a tendency to pay most attention to expenditure, process and activity, less 
attention to the production of outputs, and even less to the achievement of 
outcomes. 
  some scepticism about the motives of outsiders who offer advice, especially 
if a potential vested interest can be identified. 
  limited technical (or socio-economic) expertise in relevant subject matter, but 
no serious concern about this. There is an attitude that bureaucrats should be 
able to move between widely differing subject areas, without adequately 
recognising the importance of having high levels of subject expertise if 
outcomes are to be achieved (perhaps reflecting complacency about the 
achievement of outcomes).  
  awareness of ministerial expectations/preferences and of the need to protect 
the minister from criticism or embarrassment. 
 
Some policy theories discussed earlier are based on specific assumptions about 
whether benefits and costs are borne by few or many. For example, Becker (1983), 
in developing his theory of interest groups, assumes that costs are borne by many, 
and benefits captured by a few. In fact, among the diverse types of policies that one 
observes, it is possible to find examples with any of the four possible combinations 
of winners and losers, few and many (Table 4). In the past, many agricultural policy 
measures fell in the benefits-for-a-few/costs-for-many quadrant (e.g. marketing 
boards, two-price schemes, import quotas or tariffs, production quotas, production 
subsidies). Recently, there has been increasing attention to agricultural policies in 
the „benefits-for-many‟ column, particularly policies intended to enhance 
environmental values associated with agriculture. In some cases costs are borne by a 
few (e.g. regulations on farming practices to protect the environment, where demand 
curves are highly elastic), but more commonly we see costs for many (e.g. public 
payments to farmers for so-called environmental services).  
 
Table 4. Examples of policies based on whether benefits and costs are allocated to 
many or few in the community. 
  Benefits received by: 
Costs borne by:  Few  Many 
Few  Compulsory levy on an industry to 
fund industry-specific R&D or 
market promotion 
Environmental regulation imposed 
on an industry 
Many  Public subsidy to a specific 
industry 
Health policy; education policy 
 
This shift in emphasis has implications for the types of issues and concerns to be 
addressed by aspiring policy-relevant economists. Policies in the benefits-for-a-
few/costs-for-many quadrant are perhaps more difficult to influence, since they 
involve bestowal of political favours directly on an identifiable group. In Australia 
and New Zealand, arguments about dead-weight losses from these policies fell 
largely on deaf ears for decades until the entire political landscape changed in the   15 
early 1980s towards a more market-oriented ideology. Even then, the ideological 
shift was not sufficient at the time to change the shape of agricultural policy 
substantially in Europe and the USA, despite the key roles of Margaret Thatcher and 
Ronald Reagan in changing the political ideology.   
Subsequently, throughout the developed world, agricultural policies have shifted to 
the many/many quadrant. I suspect that policies in this quadrant may be 
fundamentally more susceptible to influence by economists, since they are at least 
partly intended to generate public benefits. Economist input ought to be welcomed if 
we can identify ways of improving the efficiency of delivering those benefits to the 
broader community. I believe that there are ample opportunities to do so.  
Conclusion 
A decision to adopt an ambition to influence an area of policy should not be taken 
lightly. The personal costs can be substantial, in terms of time, stress and frustration. 
As we have seen, the challenges are numerous and great but, on the other hand, the 
rewards of satisfaction can also be large. Economists have a particular capacity to 
analyse the public interest in a broad way, and this capacity is appreciated by many 
players in the policy process. I believe it is this that gives us our best chance to 
influence policy.  
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